Security and privacy

No analytics.
Your photos stay yours.

What Lumenkeep does, what it refuses to do, and exactly what leaves your device.

What Lumenkeep never does

  • Collect usage data, crash reports, photos, file names or anything about your libraries. There is no analytics or advertising code.
  • Ask you to create an account, or send anything to a server I run. There isn’t one.
  • Keep a master key, a reset password or a reviewer-only way in.
  • Ask for access to your whole photo library to import. The system picker gives Lumenkeep only what you choose.
  • Pretend to be a different app.

What leaves your device, and when

Every network connection Lumenkeep makes
WhatWhere toWhen
Encrypted backup snapshots (already encrypted on your device)Your own iCloud Drive, in Lumenkeep’s app folderOnly if you turn on iCloud backup (Lumenkeep Plus)
Encrypted sync data (sealed on each device, with meaningless names)Your own iCloud, in Lumenkeep’s private CloudKit databaseOnly if you turn on iCloud sync (Lumenkeep Plus)
An encrypted library transferYour other device, on your local networkOnly while you run Lumenkeep Transfer on both devices
Photos and videos you choose to show, encrypted end to endYour Apple TV running Lumenkeep, on your local networkOnly while you use Show on TV (Lumenkeep Plus). The TV keeps nothing
A family album’s items, names and captions, sealed on your device; your public sharing keyThe album owner’s iCloud, in Lumenkeep’s CloudKit database, shared through iCloud with the people the owner invitesOnly when you make, join or add to a family album
Map tiles for the area you are looking at (no photos, no places of your photos)Apple MapsOnly while the Map is open
Purchase and restoreAppleWhen you buy or restore Lumenkeep Plus

Step by step

One passphrase.
A key for every job.

Your passphrase is stretched with Argon2id into a key that opens your slot in the key file. Inside is your library key, which never leaves the device unencrypted.

You type

Your passphrase

Typed on your device. It is never stored and never sent anywhere.

Stretched

Argon2id

Three passes over 128 MiB of memory, with a random salt. Slow and memory-hungry on purpose, so every guess costs real time on any hardware.

Opens

Your slot in the key file

The result opens one sealed slot. Every slot is the same size, used or not, so the file does not show how many libraries exist. Your recovery key opens its own slot.

Unlocks

The vault key

A random 256-bit key, made once when you set up the library. It lives only in memory while the library is open.

Derives

A key for each job

HKDF turns the vault key into separate keys, so the key that seals your file names can never open a photo.

From the passphrase you type to the keys that protect your library. Nothing in this chain leaves your device, and no step can be skipped with a master key, because there is none.

Cut into pieces.
Every piece sealed.

Each photo and video gets its own key and is sealed with AES-256-GCM in chunks before anything is written.

Your photo

Read on your device

Chunked and sealed

AES-256-GCM, chunk by chunk

Written to disk

One encrypted file

  • Chunks. 256 KB for photos, 1 MB for video, so a video can start from the middle without decrypting the rest. Nothing decrypted is written to disk.
  • Sealed. Every chunk gets a 16-byte authentication tag. Change a single bit and that chunk is refused instead of shown.
  • Bound together. Each chunk carries its number and the file’s identity, so chunks cannot be swapped between files, put out of order or cut off.

A new random key for this item

Every photo and video has its own 256-bit key.

Locked with your library’s file key

Sealed with AES-GCM by the “file keys” key from step 1, and tied to this item so it cannot be moved to another one.

Kept in the encrypted database

Delete the key and the file can never be read again.

The picture is cut into chunks and each chunk is sealed on its own. The key for this item is then locked away with a key that only your open library has.

A glance to open.
Without giving up the key.

Face ID and Touch ID are optional. They unlock a copy of the library key held by this device’s Secure Enclave, which never leaves the device.

Face ID or Touch ID

Checked by iOS. Lumenkeep never sees your face or fingerprint.

Secure Enclave

A key made inside this device’s Secure Enclave. It cannot be copied out, backed up or moved.

The vault key

Released only after a match. Change your Face ID or fingerprints and it stays shut until you type your passphrase.

Face ID is a shortcut, never a replacement: the passphrase still exists, and a new device always needs it or the recovery key.

Encrypted before
it leaves your hands.

Encrypted iCloud backup and sync (Lumenkeep Plus) are off until you turn them on, and go only to your own iCloud.

Your deviceSeals everything first
Your own iCloudKeeps what it cannot read

What Apple can see

  • That Lumenkeep keeps some files in your iCloud
  • Their sizes and when they change
  • Names made of random-looking letters

What it cannot see

  • Your photos and videos
  • File names, dates, places, albums, captions
  • Your passphrase, recovery key or any key
Backups and sync use their own keys, made from the vault key on your device. Each piece is sealed with AES-GCM and named with a keyed hash, so even the names say nothing.

Primer

Argon2id,
from the beginning.

A short guide for the curious: what Argon2id is, where it came from, how its settings work, and exactly how Lumenkeep uses it.

  1. Your passphraseTidied into one standard form (Unicode NFC), so the same passphrase typed on an iPhone or a Mac gives the same result. Spaces you typed are kept.
  2. Argon2idMixed with your key file’s random salt, using 128 MiB of memory and 3 passes. Out comes a 32-byte key-encryption key.
  3. Your slotThat key is tried on all eight slots of the key file, always in the same order. Only your slot opens, sealed with AES-256-GCM.
  4. Library keyInside the slot is your library’s own random key. HKDF-SHA256 splits it into keys for each job, and every item gets its own key. The passphrase never touches your photos directly.

What it is

Argon2 is a password-hashing function: a deliberately slow, memory-hungry recipe that turns a password into a key. It won the international Password Hashing Competition in 2015 and was published as an internet standard, RFC 9106, in 2021. Argon2id is the variant that standard recommends.

Why “id”

Argon2 comes in two styles. Argon2i reads memory in an order that does not depend on your password, which resists attacks that watch timing on a shared machine. Argon2d reads memory in a password-dependent order, which is hardest for custom cracking hardware. Argon2id does the first half of its first pass the “i” way and the rest the “d” way, to get both.

Lumenkeep’s settings for new libraries and locked folders
SettingValueWhat it does
Memory (m)128 MiBEvery guess must fill and use this much memory, which is what makes guessing in bulk expensive.
Passes (t)3How many times the memory is worked through. More passes, more time per guess.
Lanes (p)1Lumenkeep uses Argon2id from libsodium, which runs in one lane. The setting is stored anyway, so a future version can change it.
Salt16 random bytesMade with each key file, and separately for each locked folder, so precomputed tables are useless and equal passphrases give different keys.
Result32 bytesA 256-bit key, used only to open your slot.

For comparison, the OWASP password storage guidance sets a floor of 19 MiB and 2 passes. Lumenkeep uses more than six times that memory, because a library key protects photos for years, not a web login.

How does it compare with PBKDF2, bcrypt and scrypt?

PBKDF2 only costs time, so graphics cards can run huge numbers of guesses side by side. bcrypt uses a small, fixed amount of memory. scrypt was the first to make memory the main cost, and Argon2 refined that idea with clearer settings and better resistance to trading memory for time. That is why it is the current recommendation.

Can the settings change later?

Yes. They are written at the top of the key file, so a future version can raise them. They are also part of what every slot’s seal checks, so lowering them in the file makes every slot refuse to open.

Does changing my passphrase re-encrypt my photos?

No. Only your slot is sealed again under the key from the new passphrase. Your photos stay as they are, so the change is instant even for a large library. To move everything to new keys, use Rotate Encryption.

Do Face ID, a YubiKey or the recovery key skip Argon2id?

They don’t need it, because there is no password to guess. Face ID uses a key inside this device’s Secure Enclave, which never leaves it. A security key answers with a secret that never leaves the key, turned into a key with HKDF. The recovery key is 180 random bits. Your passphrase slot keeps its Argon2id protection alongside them. A locked folder that requires a security key needs both: its seal comes from the folder password’s Argon2id key and the key’s answer together.

Wrong tries already wait longer. Why Argon2id as well?

The growing wait and the opt-in erase after 10 wrong tries happen inside the app. Someone who copied your key file off the device could skip them. Argon2id is what still makes each of their guesses cost 128 MiB of memory and real time.

So how strong should my passphrase be?

Argon2id multiplies the cost of every guess, but it cannot rescue a passphrase near the top of a guessing list. Lumenkeep asks for at least 8 characters; four or more unrelated words put a library far out of reach of guessing.

Security model

  • Content: AES-256-GCM with a separate key for every item; videos in authenticated chunks, so a damaged or altered chunk is rejected.
  • Passphrase: Argon2id, memory-hard, with 128 MiB and 3 passes for every guess. See the Argon2id primer below.
  • Face ID and Touch ID: a Secure Enclave key on this device wraps the library key, with access tied to the current biometric enrolment.
  • Key file: a fixed set of equal-size slots, so its size does not reveal how many libraries exist.
  • Storage: iOS Data Protection on top, and files excluded from unencrypted device backups.
  • Backups and sync: encrypted before upload with their own keys, and named with a keyed hash; Apple stores data it cannot read. Restoring needs your passphrase or recovery key.
  • Records: names, dates, places, albums, captions, tags and thumbnails are sealed in an encrypted database, not only the photos.
  • Screenshots: on iPhone and iPad, private content is drawn in a layer iOS leaves out of screenshots and recordings, on by default. It depends on iOS behaviour, so Lumenkeep falls back to covering the screen during recording if that ever changes. Another camera can always photograph the screen.
  • Deleting: Recently Deleted keeps items 30 days; deleting for good destroys the item’s key, then removes its file.
  • Rotate Encryption: re-encrypts everything under new keys, with the key file rewrite as the single commit point, and issues a new recovery key.
  • Opt-in erase: if you turn it on, every library on the device is erased after 10 wrong passphrases, with warnings from the fifth.
  • Share extension: items shared into Lumenkeep wait in its app group folder, protected by iOS Data Protection but not yet by Lumenkeep’s own encryption, until your next unlock imports them.

See each step animated on How it works

Limits

No app can protect photos on a device that is already compromised, or from someone who can force you to unlock it. The alternate library helps against a casual look, not a forensic examination. The encryption design has not had an independent security review. It is built from standard, well-studied pieces: AES-256-GCM from Apple’s CryptoKit, and Argon2id from libsodium for the passphrase. The design is described in full on this page.

Requests from authorities

No one but you holds the key to your library, so no one, including me, can unlock it on request. The details are in Terms of use.

Report a vulnerability

Please email security@lumenkeep.app. I reply within three working days. Please give me 90 days before publishing. See also security.txt.

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